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1 Introduction
Network structures are pervasive in modern economies: people spend increasing amounts of time
and money on internet services, organisations link themselves to other organisations with various
cooperational relationships. At the same time, competition in many network industries is under-
taken on various levels that mix strategic investments and price competition. This complexity
generates interesting competitive rm behaviour. In this paper, we examine the e¤ects of demand
side network externalities on strategic cost reducing R&D investments. We augment a standard
horizontal di¤erentiation model by introducing network externalities into the demand side and
involuntary spillovers into R&D production. Technological change has been an element in net-
work economics since Farrell & Saloner (1985), David (1985) and Arthur (1989), but the feature
that technological investments are imperfectly appropriable has been overlooked. The merger of
strategic R&D and networks brings up new kinds of rm behaviour that renes the results of
earlier literature.
Imperfect appropriability of R&D and its consequences on industrial competition, as well as
the performance of di¤erent forms of R&D cooperation, in terms of welfare, have been studied by,
among others: Spence (1984), dAspremont & Jacquemin (1988, 1990), Henriques (1990), Kamien
et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992), Suzumura & Yanagawa (1993), and Amir (2000). De Bondt (1997)
is a survey of R&D appropriability literature. In strategic investment games, the total e¤ect of
R&D spillovers consists of a market expansion e¤ect that encourages R&D investments as well
as a competitive e¤ect that discourages R&D. De Bondt (1997) generalises that the competitive
e¤ect dominates the market expansion e¤ect, and therefore, spillovers tend to have a discouraging
e¤ect on an individual rms willingness to invest in strategic R&D. Yet, De Bondt (1997) claims
that the negative relationship may reverse with a small number of rivals and su¢ cient product
di¤erentiation. Asymmetry between rms can result in increasing R&D in spillovers. For example,
if one rm is better in appropriating R&D than other rms, it may increase its e¤orts when
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spillovers increase. On the other hand, e¤ective R&D that measures total cost reduction for a
rm, i.e. rm-specic R&D plus the spillover benets from other rms, tends to be increasing
up to a certain spillovers threshold. When spillovers exceed the threshold, also e¤ective R&D
decreases in spillovers. Product di¤erentiation raises the threshold.
Even though the negative association between rm-specic R&D and spillovers is the general
result in the strategic R&D literature, other results have a tendency to be dependent on the chosen
model set-up. Hence, many results appear not to be too robust. For example, Amir (2000) reports
that the e¤ective R&D level increases in the dAspremont & Jacquemin (1988, 1990) set-up when
spillovers are relatively small and decreases when spillovers are large. But, the set-up used by
Kamien et al. (1992) produces decreasing e¤ective R&D for all spillover levels.
Network incompatibility may arise from many sources such as technical product features or
personal tastes. Following Katz & Shapiro (1985), the compatibility literature has focused on the
technical interpretation and analysed private and social incentives for compatibility. Incompat-
ibilities create implicit switching costs. Beggs & Klemperer (1992) show that consumer prices
are higher with switching costs than without. Besen & Farrell (1994) interpret this result as a
tendency of incompatibility to tone down price competition. Incompatibility represents a degree
of consumer lock-in, which allows the rm to charge above the price of perfectly compatible goods.
Even though Besen & Farrell (1994) leave some room for doubt, they report the literature gener-
ally agreeing on that incompatibilities reduce (price) competition. Bental & Spiegel (1995) analyse
a network competition model with income-wise di¤erentiated consumers. Richer consumers are
willing to pay more for a network of a given size. They show that consumers prefer compatible
networks as market coverage is the highest and price the lowest under compatibility. The re-
sult, however, comes from free entry of rms. In contrast, Shy (2001) shows how "compatibility
is anticompetitive". The key to his conclusion is that, with incompatible goods, market share
competition is the dominating feature, which drives prices down. Shy (2001) explains that, with
incompatibility, consumers care about the price di¤erence between goods and about the sizes of
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rm-specic networks. Under perfect compatibility, price competition is relaxed, since the sizes of
rm-specic networks become irrelevant as all consumers attain the benets of the whole network.
Firm-specic market shares carry strategic value only under incompatibility.
It is interesting to expose the results of R&D models to network externalities. The combina-
tion is more than the sum of parts. In this paper, we employ demand side network externalities
that resemble the telecommunications interconnection tra¢ c in La¤ont et al.s (1997, 1998) and
Armstrongs (1998) models. We extend the game with a stage in which rms choose R&D invest-
ments. Our focus is on cost-reducing (process) R&D and its implications on price competition1 .
The main item of interest in our model is consumer interaction; each consumer gets utility from
interaction with others. Two rms each serve a network of consumers. Networks are vertically
di¤erentiated and they may be linked with di¤erent degrees of compatibility. Firms choose R&D
investment levels in the rst period. In the second period, they set prices.
Network externalities are prone to produce multiple equilibria. Multiplicity causes that equi-
librium analysis does not yield determinate predictions. We overcome the multiplicity problem by
di¤erentiating consumers à la Hotelling (1929). With su¢ cient price insensitivity, we get a unique
interior equilibrium. We also consider a conceptually more interesting vertical di¤erentiation of
networks. Vertical di¤erentiation is exogenous, which makes possible the analysis of asymmetric
set-ups.
We show how asymmetric equilibria di¤er from a symmetric one, and when the asymmetric
equilibria involve rm behaviour which disagrees with the conventional results of strategic R&D
and network compatibility models. Our model adds to the complexity in results of conventional
models, rather than generalises them. The main ndings are:
1. We derive a case where a rm increases rm-specic R&D investments under a marginal
increase in spillovers: the rm with lower quality product tends to increase R&D under an
1 For a network model à la Armstrong (1998) - La¤ont et al. (1998) with product R&D that improves the
quality of the good, see Valletti & Cambini (2003).
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increase in spillovers if R&D and rm-specic network size have high strategic value. This
happens when networks are (almost) perfectly incompatible and spillovers small.
2. We characterise conditions where Shys (2001) result "compatibility is anticompetitive" fails
in its strongest form: the rm with lower quality product tends to decrease its price with an
increase in compatibility, again, if R&D and rm-specic network size have high strategic
value. Price decreases because the rm chooses to increase R&D investments in order to cut
costs.
Under competition, private and social incentives for network compatibility are aligned, but
they di¤er for R&D appropriability in general. In the situations where we have the unorthodox
behaviour detailed in 1 and 2 above, consumer surplus and the higher quality rms prots move
together and dominate the opposite change in the lower quality rms prots with marginal changes
in compatibility and R&D appropriability.
Findings from a symmetric model agree with the existing literature. Because asymmetry can
produce unorthodox results, literature which focuses on symmetric equilibria fail to capture all
prevailing e¤ects.
In section 2, the model is constructed and equilibrium is derived. Then the equilibrium is
subjected to comparative statics analysis. We illustrate the unorthodox results with a numerical
example. After that we bring forth some issues on total surplus. We conclude with a discussion.
All proofs of results are straightforward and are relegated to the appendix.
2 Model
We are interested in industries that present demand side network externalities and some degree of
product compatibility. We will later formally propose a compatibility measure that incorporates
personal tastes as well as pure technical compatibility.
As an example of our model, consider instant messaging (IM) software that allows people to
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communicate over the Internet. A user of IM software benets when there are more people on
the IM network. Yahoo!, MSN or AOL IM do not interoperate, but users of Gaim, Adium or
Trillian IM can communicate with users of (practically) any other IM software2 . In addition to
basic instant messaging, some IM software includes more advanced communication, le swapping,
and entertainment features. The choice of IM software depends heavily on the versatility of the
software as well as on the brand factor (e.g. some consumers have preferences to use only open-
source rather than commercial software). But if software is incompatible, then also the size of
the user network matters. The second example is software, such as spreadsheets, that allows
consumers to share work with other people. Users of a particular brand of spreadsheet may use
les created by di¤erent brands. Brands may not be perfectly compatible so that some software
functionalities do not work thoroughly. Some users may dislike the way information is handled
in one brand of software, and therefore may swap les less with users of that brand. Another
example is game consoles (e.g. PlayStation 2, Xbox, or Game Cube) that allow playing against
other people over an Internet connection. Consoles tend to support little interoperability. A
particular game seldom works on more than one brand, even if there exists many versions of the
game (which cover the whole console spectrum). The nal example is mobile telecommunications.
Here, the demand side externalities arising from person to person communication are obvious, but
brand preference in interaction is (almost) negligible3 .
There are two rms in the market, say A and B. The market is closed and the number of
consumers xed. Consumers are evenly distributed over a unit line according to their subjective
taste preferences. Each rm is exogenously located at one extreme of the line and the locations
are inherited from outside this model, so that rm A is located at 0 and rm B at 1.
2 Some multi-medium software, such as Trillian, actually allows the users to log-on simultaneously to "host"
IM networks of Yahoo!, MSN or AOL (among others), rather than being standalone IM networks. However, the
multi-medium IM software incorporate features that are not supported by the host networks making them more
than pure adapters. Usually the basic versions of IM software are free of charge, but more advanced features have
to be bought.
3 We assume that rms charge simple at rate fees without interconnection payments. This reduces applicability
of our model to (voice) telecommunications. However, SMS services and similar new services are a better t
compared to pure voice services.
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Consumers have unit demand. The product yields intrinsic utility and utility contingent on all
other consumers who have bought the product. The idea is that utility is driven by peer-to-peer
types of services that enable interaction between consumers, and interaction utility can be split
into two parts. First, the consumer gets utility from consumers who have bought from the same
rm as he has. This network of consumers is referred to as a "home network" and the utility
is labelled as an "intra-network utility". Secondly, the consumer may also get utility from the
consumers who have bought from the other rm. This network is referred to as a "rival network",
and the utility as an "inter-network utility". Interaction utility depends on the sizes of home and
rival networks and on the compatibility between networks. Consumers who have not bought any
product give zero utility to those that have. If the consumer located at s 2 [0; 1] on the Hotelling
beach, buys the product, he gets intrinsic utility V (s) = v   l (s) z; where v > 0 is a xed base
utility, and l (s) is the distance to the supplier. Transportation cost parameter z measures how
well the product matches the consumers subjective preferences. Consumers are assumed not to
be constrained by their budgets, and v is large enough so that all consumers opt for purchasing
the product independent of other consumersdecisions. As a result, the consumers problem is
reduced to choosing from which rm he buys.
Firm i charges a at rate pi: Net utility for a consumer located at s who buys from rm
i = A;B; i 6= j is then
Ui (s) = v   l (s) z + nivi + njvi   pi: (1)
The principal item of interest in equation (1) is the interaction utility given by nivi + njvi:
For the consumer that has decided to buy from rm i, intra-network utility is nivi, where ni
is the number of consumers on the home network. Parameter vi measures the objective value
associated with each network member. It gives the usage value of services used in interaction.
This objective valuation is shared by all consumers and it is independent of subjective taste. A
consumer located in the middle of the Hotelling beach can be indi¤erent between the goods in terms
of subjective attractiveness but strictly prefer one good to the other in terms of objective quality.
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Term njvi gives the respective inter-network utility from a rival network of size nj with objective
value vi: Our specication of network externalities implicitly assumes that the underlying social
network characterising consumersrelationships is a completely connected graph. Each consumer
is connected to everyone else.
The consumer gains at most equal utility from a single rival network member compared to
a home network member. The rationale behind this assumption is that it is likely that similar
types of consumers choose to buy from the same rm, and that consumers interact more with
people similar to them. In the absence of usage fees, the rival network is less regularly accessed4
. Furthermore, there might be technical incompatibilities between rival goods which hamper
inter-network interaction. From the perspective of a consumer, the assumption that an individual
consumer on the home network is at least valuable as one on the rival network translates into a
condition vi  vi, which can be parameterised as vi  vi (1  t), where t 2 [0; 1] measures network
compatibility. The proposed concept of network compatibility should be understood arising from
consumerstastes and from technical compatibility features. The following example claries this.
A consumer, who has bought from rm A, located at s interacts more with people located close
to s (call these people ss friends). He also has a bias towards interacting more with friends who
are on his home network. At the margin, where half of the consumers friends are on his home
network and half on the rival network, the bias in favour of home network is captured in t: If there
is no bias between networks, we have t = 0: If, however, network brand determines perfectly with
whom he interacts with, t = 1:
Our assumption of covered and closed markets, removes network expansion e¤ects of R&D.
An improvement in network compatibility, however, captures some forms of market expansion.
Dene the e¢ cient network size as nivi + njvi (1  t). As t is lowered, the e¤ective size grows.
If networks are perfectly incompatible (t = 1), the rival network does not yield utility. In
4 Note that we do not need to make any formal assumptions on the balance of access between networks since
consumers make a single at rate payment to the rm. Compare this with telecommunications industry models by
Armstrong (1998) or La¤ont et al. (1997, 1998) who assume a neutral calling pattern.
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the typology of Besen & Farrell (1994), perfect incompatibility makes the rms compete for the
market. In this case, rm-specic market shares are important in consumersdecision making. The
polar case, perfect compatibility (t = 0), produces competition within the market. In this case,
consumers get the full benets of the total network, and rm-specic network sizes are irrelevant
in consumersdecision making.
Consumers expectations on network sizes are fullled in the equilibrium. The indi¤erence
condition UA (s) = UB (s) determines market shares uniquely. The market share for rm A is
s =
z   pA + pB + (1  t) vA   vB
2z   t (vA + vB) : (2)
The rmsproblem is to maximise prots by choosing R&D investments and setting unit prices.
Investments in R&D reduce unit production costs capturing the idea of process R&D. Let xi be
the autonomous, or rm-specic, output of rm is R&D investment. We eliminate the case in
which R&D spillovers would ow only from the R&D leader to the laggard by interpreting xi so
that it represents both R&D output and total input including all trials and errors. A fraction
of R&D output, xi, is spilled over to the rival without any cost or compensation. The spillover
parameter,  2 [0; 1], is symmetric between rms. The e¤ective cost reduction for rm i is then
Xi = xi+xj . Productivity of R&D is independent of spillovers, and the rms own and the rivals
R&D are substitutes. The potentially undesirable possibility that one rm can benet passively
from the rivals R&D is not dealt with. A rm can enjoy cost reduction even if it does not invest
in R&D at all. The unit cost per sale for rm i is Ci = c   Xi, where c > 0 is assumed to be
symmetric between rms5 .
5 Di¤erent approaches to modeling R&D and spillovers are abundant: for example, Levin & Reiss (1988)
and Kesteloot & De Bondt (1993) assume imperfect substitutability of autonomous R&D and an industry-wide
pool of R&D. Of other variants Cohen & Levinthal (1989) (variable learning capacities and intra-industry R&D
spillovers), De Bondt & Henriques (1995) (asymmetric spillovers and R&D absorption capabilities) and Katsoulacos
& Ulph (1998) (endogenous spillovers) are among the most interesting ones. See also Amir (2000) who looks at
the di¤erences between dAspremont & Jacquemins (1988, 1990) and Kamien et al.s (1992) formulations of R&D
productivity. However, we nd symmetry and the absence of industry R&D pools in our set-up appropriate
considering the small number of rms. We also consciously ignore other more sophisticated treatments of R&D
and spillovers.
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The objective functions for rm A and B are
A = s [pA   (c  xA   xB)]  12x2A
B = (1  s) [pB   (c  xB   xA)]  12x2B ;
(3)
where R&D costs are given by   12x2i ; i = A;B.
3 Equilibrium
The rms maximise prots (3) in two stages. In the rst stage, they choose simultaneous R&D
investments (xA; xB) ; and in the second stage they set prices (pA; pB) simultaneously. We solve
the problem for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (NE).
Second stage best responses are
pi (pj) =
1
2
[pj + c  (xi + xj) + (1  t) vi   vj + z] : (4)
Reactions (4) are upward sloping, characteristic of Bertrand price competition. They cross cor-
rectly to produce a stable equilibrium6 . Note that the reaction to a marginal increase in the value
of rival product is tougher than to an increase in the value of the rms own product.
NE prices are
pNEi = c+ z  
1
3
[(2 + )xi + (1 + 2)xj   (1  2t) vi + (1 + t) vj ] : (5)
The rms own R&D causes a larger drop in price than the rivals R&D does, @p
NE
i
@xi
 @pNEi@xj , with
equality at  = 1. Hence, all things constant, an increase in R&D by one rm increases its market
share.
First stage best responses are
xi (xj) =
(1  2t) vi   (1 + t) vj + 3z   (1  )xj
A  (1  ) ; (6)
where A = 92(1 ) [2z   t (vA + vB)] : First stage reaction functions have a cut-o¤ point where
R&D investments change from being strategic complements to strategic substitutes. Strategic
6 Stability is ensured since
 @pi@pj  = 12 < 1: Second stage second order conditions require that z > 12 t (vA + vB) :
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complementarity, however, is ruled out by the second order condition for a maximum7 . Since the
reaction functions are linear, they cross at most once. Thus if there is an interior equilibrium, it
is unique and corresponds to the fullled expectations equilibrium of consumersproblem.
NE investments are given by equation (7).
xNEi =
(1  2t) vi   (1 + t) vj + 3z   23 (1  )2
A  2 (1  ) : (7)
NE investments can be presented as xNEA =
2
3 (1  ) sNE and xNEB = 23 (1  )
 
1  sNE. In the
case of symmetric market shares, investments are equal. If one rm has smaller market share,
it also invests less in R&D. Industry-wide R&D e¤ort depends only on spillovers, xNEA + x
NE
B =
2
3 (1  ) ; underlining the absence of the market expansion e¤ect. The industry-wide e¤ective
cost reduction is (1 + )
 
xNEA + x
NE
B

= 23
 
1  2. Obviously, both industry-wide investment
and e¤ective output are decreasing on the whole range  2 [0; 1], and they drop to zero with perfect
spillovers. There are no incentives to do R&D when it does not yield competitive advantage.
A general condition for equilibrium stability is
@xi(xj)@xj  < 1 (Tirole 1988). This condition
requires in the current model that A   2 (1  ) > 0. E¤ectively, this condition sets a lower
limit for the transportation costs. The condition guarantees also that second order conditions for
maximum hold. Hence, the following condition (A1) is required to hold in equilibrium8 .
Assumption (A1) Minimum price insensitivity: z > 12
h
t (vA + vB) +
2
9 (1  )2
i
:
Using NE prices and investments, rm is NE market share can be expressed as
sNEi =
1
2
  (vj   vi)
 
1  12 t

2
3 (1  ) [A  2 (1  )]
: (8)
7 Strategic complementary and substitutability are dened as in Bulow et al. (1985). First stage second order
conditions require that z > 1
2
t (vA + vB) +
1
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(1  )2 , A > (1  ), which is more stringent condition than
the second stage second order conditions. Now, the second order conditions for the rst stage rule out the case
in which @xA
@xB
would be positive. Consequently, investments are always strategic substitutes. Unique strategic
substitutability is a simplication of the general tendency of mixed strategic substitutability and complementarity
in strategic R&D investments. De Bondt (1997) states that, in general with quadratic payo¤s, rst stage investments
are strategic substitutes when spillovers are below a certain critical level, and strategic complements with spillovers
that exceed the critical level. Here, there is no critical threshold in that sense.
8 Fudenberg & Tiroles (1991) su¢ cient condition for asymptotic equilibrium stability is
 @xi@xj   @xj@xi  < 1. For
the current model, this stability condition is satised when A2   2 (1  ) > 0. The results of the model do not
change if we require A2   2 (1  ) > 0 instead of A  2 (1  ) > 0:
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Note that the denominator in equation (8) is positive by condition (A1).
4 Comparative statics
4.1 E¢ ciency benchmark
A competitive duopoly produces industry-wide R&D levels which are lower than the social opti-
mum. We show this with a comparison between the competitive industry and a Ramsey bench-
mark. In the Ramsey case, we maximise consumer surplus conditional on the industry breaking
even. When qualities are asymmetric, this may involve transfers between rms. Consumer surplus
is
CS = v +
Z s
0
[svA + (1  s) (1  t) vA   pA   zl] dl+
+
Z 1
s
[s (1  t) vB + (1  s) vB   pB   z (1  l)] dl (9)
The Lagrangian of the Ramsey maximisation problem is
L = CS    (A + B) ; (10)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier. Second stage optimisation of (10) gives the socially optimal
prices
 
pRA; p
R
B

: Prices are the same if qualities are identical, otherwise they di¤er. First stage
optimisation of (10) gives socially optimal R&D levels
 
xRA; x
R
B

: The Ramsey industry-wide R&D
equals to
xRA + x
R
B = 1 + : (11)
In the competitive duopoly, the industry-wide R&D level is
xNEA + x
NE
B =
2
3
(1  ) : (12)
It is evident that the competitive industry always produces socially too little R&D.
4.2 Symmetric qualities
We start the analysis of the competitive duopoly equilibrium with a case of symmetric qualities
(vA = vB = ev). Symmetric rms split the market 50=50: Market share e¤ects due to changes in
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 and t are neutralised with symmetric qualities, ds
NE
SYM
d =
dsNESYM
dt = 0: With symmetry, the rst
stage NE degenerates into a simple relationship between R&D and spillovers,
xNESYM =
1
3
(1  ) : (13)
The two comparative statics that are of interest, namely dx
NE
SYM
d and
dxNESYM
dt , are trivial. Both
rm-specic and e¤ective R&D are decreasing in  2 [0; 1]. On the other hand, dxNESYMdt is zero. In
this case, neither rm can take advantage of the other rms network due to symmetric behaviour
that cancels out.
NE prices are
pNESYM = c+ z   tev   13  1  2 : (14)
The last term in equation (14) equals e¤ective R&D. Not surprisingly, NE prices increase as
spillovers increase. This is due to decreasing investments in the rst stage. More interestingly,
higher levels of network compatibility are associated with higher prices. With some degree of in-
compatibility (t > 0) rms are involved in competition for market share. This competition pushes
prices down. Price competition is at the most intense level when consumer networks are com-
pletely incompatible (t = 1). Whereas the highest prots are attained with perfectly compatible
goods (t = 0). Incompatibility represents a degree of lock-in of consumers, which softens price
competition, but only imperfectly. Despite consumer utility would look likely to increase as pa-
rameter t decreases; the benet is o¤set by the increase in prices. In this sense, the parameter
t acts as a device of tacit collusion, similar to the interconnection charge in telecommunications
models (à la La¤ont et al. 1998). Finally, prots increase in spillovers because of smaller outlays
in R&D.
4.3 Asymmetric qualities
Like the NE investment functions point out, market share dynamics have a central role in the
model. Therefore, it is useful to derive comparative statics for the NE market shares. Lemmas 1
and 2 summarise these statics.
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Lemma 1 (i) The market share of the rm with a lower quality good is increasing in spillovers
dsNE
d
> 0, vA < vB :
(ii) The market share of the smaller rm is increasing in spillovers.
Lemma 2 (i) With su¢ ciently high price sensitivity, z < vA + vB   29 (1  )2, the market share
of the rm with a lower quality good is increasing in network compatibility
dsNE
dt
< 0, vA < vB :
(ii) With su¢ ciently low price sensitivity, z > vA + vB   29 (1  )2 ; the market share
of the rm with a lower quality good is decreasing in network compatibility
dsNE
dt
> 0, vA < vB :
Because network compatibility is foremost associated with consumers utility, and rmsprots
depend on it only indirectly, it is worthwhile to study what kind of impact a change in the
parameter t has on intra- and inter-network utilities, which equal to svA + (1  s) (1  t) vA for
rm As customers.
First, if the rms market share is decreasing in network compatibility, then intra-network
utility is also decreasing in compatibility. Smaller home network yields less intra-network utility.
Second, a decrease in compatibility has both a direct e¤ect and an indirect e¤ect on inter-
network utility. These two e¤ects are d[(1 s)(1 t)vA]dt =   (1  s) vA| {z }
direct e¤ect
  (1  t) vA ds
dt| {z }
indirect e¤ect
for rm A.
The direct e¤ect of is always negative. If a decrease in compatibility increases home network size
(dsdt > 0), then the indirect e¤ect is negative as well. Smaller rival network yields less inter-network
utility.
Consider a case with high price sensitivity (as dened in Lemma 2) and a reduction in network
compatibility (dt > 0). The market share of the lower quality good rm decreases. Its customers
get a negative utility e¤ect through intra-network utility. They also get a negative direct e¤ect
through the inter-network utility. Negative e¤ects are partly compensated by a positive indirect
inter-network e¤ect due to the increase in the size of the rival network. If networks are relatively
incompatible, the positive e¤ect is not very strong. It becomes stronger with higher compatibility
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levels. At the extreme, with perfectly compatible networks, the intra-network e¤ect is cancelled
by the positive indirect e¤ect of inter-network utility, i.e. the terms with dsdt cancel out. Perfect
compatibility eliminates the strategic role of rm-specic network size.
4.3.1 Comparative statics with respect to spillovers
Conventionally, in strategic investment games, the dominant competitive e¤ect of spillovers guar-
antees that rm-specic R&D unambiguously decreases as spillovers increase. Since, the market
expansion e¤ect is absent in the current model, the competitive e¤ect should guarantee a negative
relationship between R&D investments and spillovers. Even if this relation still holds in most
cases with asymmetric qualities as well as in the symmetric case, it is not true universally. With
asymmetry in the product qualities and high strategic value of R&D and rm-specic networks,
the disadvantaged rm increases its investments under a marginal increase in spillovers.
Direct di¤erentiation of xNEA with respect to  gives the following formula
dxNEA
d
=  2
3
sNE

1 +
1  

"s

; (15)
where "s =  


sNE

dsNE
d

is the elasticity of market share with respect to spillovers9 . Increase
in spillovers always induces a direct e¤ect to reduce investments. There is also an indirect e¤ect
through market share. The rm with higher market share always cuts back investments since its
market share decreases as spillovers increase. Smaller rms market share is growing in spillovers.
When its market share is su¢ ciently elastic, the positive e¤ect can dominate, and the rm increases
its R&D investments with an increase in spillovers.
Proposition 3 (i) The rm increases its autonomous NE R&D investments with a marginal
increase in the level of R&D spillovers, if the elasticity of its market share with respect to spillovers
is su¢ ciently high
dxNEA
d
> 0, "s <

   1 :
(ii) The rm with a higher market share always decreases R&D investments under
a marginal increase in spillovers.
(iii) The positive relation dx
NE
A
d > 0 is more likely with high quality di¤erence, and
with low absolute levels of spillovers. The positive relation is also more likely with low levels of
network compatibility, conditional on su¢ ciently high price sensitivity.
9 Since consumers have unit demand, the elasticity of market share corresponds to the elasticity of demand.
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The idea in Proposition 3 is that the smaller rm can take advantage of the possibility to grow
its home network (when t is large). The larger rm always invests more in R&D than its rival,
but once spillovers are increased, it wants to limit the leakage. It reduces R&D, which increases
its costs and subsequently drives its price up. As the larger rm becomes relatively less attractive,
the smaller rm can a¤ord to attack. It invests more. In the new situation, network externalities
generated by a larger home network outweigh the quality disadvantage, though the smaller rm
remains smaller. Higher network externalities compensate for lower quality.
The comparative static for the NE price of rm A is given by equation (16).
dpNEA
d
=
   1  2sNE  2  2  sNE [2z   t (vA + vB)]  34 (1  )2
(1  ) [A  2 (1  )] : (16)
Proposition 4 There exists (at least one) threshold level , above which both rms increase their
NE prices under a marginal increase in spillovers. Below the threshold, the smaller rm (in terms
of market share) reduces and the larger rm increases its NE price.
Since rm size is directly related to the quality di¤erence of the goods, the rm with a lower
quality good decreases its price under a marginal increase in spillovers when  < : Otherwise
both rms increase price due to smaller outlays in R&D.
4.3.2 Comparative statics with respect to network compatibility
In the symmetric case, network compatibility is neutralised in the investment decisions. The
situation becomes more interesting with asymmetric qualities, which reintroduce the competitive
nature of network size and network compatibility into the game. By di¤erentiating rm As NE
investments, we get
dxNEA
dt
=
2
3
(1  ) ds
NE
dt
: (17)
Proposition 5 gives the equilibrium behaviour of the lower quality rm. The investment be-
haviour of the high quality rm is of opposite sign.
Proposition 5 (i) With su¢ ciently high price sensitivity, z < vA+vB  29 (1  )2, the low quality
rm decreases R&D under a marginal decrease in network compatibility
dxNEA
dt
< 0, vA < vB :
15
(ii) With su¢ ciently low price sensitivity, z > vA+vB  29 (1  )2 ; the low quality
rm increases R&D under a marginal decrease in network compatibility
dxNEA
dt
> 0, vA < vB :
Consider an asymmetric case where ds
NE
dt < 0. An increase in network compatibility results in
a gain in intra-network utility for rm As customers due to the increase in rm As market share.
In addition, the direct e¤ect of the inter-network utility is positive as well, but the indirect e¤ect
is negative. However, the negative indirect e¤ect never dominates the positive e¤ects. Hence, rm
As customers face a positive impact on their utility in total. The competitive position of rm A
is improved, which motivates it to increase investments.
Although the rms increase prices with an increase in network compatibility in general, the
opposite reaction is possible. A rm may decrease its price if its market share is elastic enough.
Firm As price response to a decrease in network compatibility is
dpNEA
dt
=  1
3

2
3
(1  )2 ds
NE
dt
+ 2vA + vB

: (18)
With high price sensitivity dened as in Lemma 2, Proposition 6 summarises price changes.
Proposition 6 Let vA < vB ; then under a marginal decrease in network compatibility (dt > 0):
(i) High quality rm
8><>:
decreases its price when price sensitivity is high
decreases its price when price sensitivity is low and 0 < ds
NE
dt <
2vB+vA
2
3 (1 )2
increases its price when price sensitivity is low and ds
NE
dt >
2vB+vA
2
3 (1 )2
(ii) Low quality rm
8><>:
decreases its price when price sensitivity is high and 0 > ds
NE
dt >   2vA+vB2
3 (1 )2
increases its price when price sensitivity is high and ds
NE
dt <   2vA+vB2
3 (1 )2
decreases its price when price sensitivity is low
Note that the higher are R&D spillovers, the greater must the change in market share be in
order to obtain the positive result dp
NE
A
dt > 0. In general, the case
dpNEA
dt < 0 is dominant.
5 Numerical example
We have derived two results that work against the general ndings. The rst one is that a rm
can increase its autonomous R&D investments if spillovers are marginally increased. The second
result is that a rm can decrease its price when network compatibility is marginally increased.
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E1
E2 Firm B
Firm A
Figure 1: First stage reactions, t = 1:
The origin of both results is in network externalities. The unorthodox behaviour appears only
when R&D and rm-specic networks have high strategic value.
We can clarify the results with a numerical example. Consider a duopoly with the following
set of parameters: v = 2; vA = 0:72; vB = 0:8; z = 1; c = 0:25: Firm A has a 10% disadvantage in
terms of product quality. Consumers are relatively price sensitive as the transportation cost is set
at a low level (as dened in Lemma 2) motivating the rms to engage in harsher price competition
as undercutting is more e¤ective. The parameter conguration characterises a market with an
incumbent and an entrant. Entrants product su¤ers from early development phase problems, so
that its objective quality is slightly lower than incumbents. However, the entrant has established
an equally attractive brand (captured in the uniform distribution on Hotelling beach).
5.1 Changes in spillovers
We rst demonstrate the case in which dx
NE
i
d > 0 holds for the smaller rm. In the rst situation,
consumer networks are incompatible, t = 1. This is the archetypical case for competition for the
market as categorised by Besen & Farrell (1994). Figures 1 and 2 show the reaction functions in
both stages as spillovers change from 1 = 0:05 to 2 = 0:15:
The initial equilibrium E1; corresponding to 1 = 0:05, is given by the crossing of the solid
reaction curves. The equilibrium after the change is E2; at the crossing of the dashed lines. Firm
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E1
E2
Firm A
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Figure 2: Second stage reactions, t = 1:
A has increased its investments. Firm B reduces its investments because an invested unit of
R&D becomes strategically less e¤ective. Since rm B invests more in absolute terms, its own
investments dominate its behaviour in the second stage. Cut down of investments leads to a higher
price for rm B. The positive spillover e¤ect caused by an increase in rm As investments never
dominates rm Bs investments. Firm A decreases its price due to an increase in investments.
Because networks are incompatible, home network has a high strategic value which compensates
for (low) quality. Firm A realises the possibility to increase home network size as rm B becomes
less attractive.
In the initial situation, rmsprots are 1A = 0:0306 and 
1
B = 0:1251; and rm A has a
market share of sNE
1
= 0:3310: After the change in appropriability conditions, rmsprots are
2A = 0:0553 and 
2
B = 0:1089; and rm A has increased its market share to s
NE2 = 0:4161:
In the symmetric case, when networks were fully compatible, price competition was relaxed
as rm-specic network sizes became irrelevant. Hence, it would be logical to expect that as
network compatibility increases, the unorthodox aggressive behaviour of the underdog illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2 would soften. This in fact is true. Only the extreme case t = 1 and its
proximate values produce the unorthodox behaviour of rm A. The typical relation of decreasing
R&D in spillovers emerges with higher network compatibility. As the parameter t is decreased, the
elasticity of market share gets closer to zero, and any market share expansion triggered by a change
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in spillovers becomes too small to justify aggressive investment behaviour. With higher levels of
network compatibility, home network size has less strategic value, and therefore the underdog wins
more by concurring with the dominant rms strategy.
At the extreme when networks are perfectly compatible (t = 0), we have the archetypical case
for competition within market. Consumers do not distinguish between home and rival networks
eliminating any strategic motives for market share competition. Consider the same parameter set
and perfect compatibility. Again, the change in spillovers is from 1 = 0:05 to 2 = 0:15. Firm
A cuts its investments from xNE
1
A = 0:3061 to x
NE2
A = 0:2743: Firm Bs investments decrease
from xNE
1
B = 0:3272 to x
NE2
B = 0:2923: Firm As market share increases from s
NE1 = 0:4833
to sNE
2
= 0:4841: This happens because it benets from a larger share of rivals R&D. Prots
increase for both rms due to savings in R&D and increased price level (tacit collusion e¤ect). For
rm A; prots go up from NE
1
A = 0:4204 to 
NE2
A = 0:4311; and for rm B from 
NE1
B = 0:4804
to NE
2
B = 0:4895: Hence, rm behaviour is regular.
5.2 Changes in compatibility
The case where both rms raise prices if compatibility is increased, is the most common case,
which underlines the general result "compatibility is anticompetitive" by Shy (2001). Still, we can
construct situations where the underdog rm has incentives to decrease its price under a marginal
increase in compatibility. This happens only when R&D and rm-specic networks have high
strategic value. Price drop results from a boost in R&D output. Consider the same parameter
set, as in previous section, with zero spillovers,  = 0: Table (19) gives the model output for cases
t = 1, t = 0:95; and t = 0:9:
xNEA x
NE
B p
NE
A p
NE
B 
NE
A 
NE
B s
NE
t = 1 0:0833 0:5833 0:2267 0:0867 0:0040 0:1974 0:1250
t = 0:95 0:2497 0:4170 0:2086 0:1808 0:0468 0:1306 0:3745
t = 0:9 0:2812 0:3855 0:2354 0:2300 0:0729 0:1370 0:4218
(19)
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Firm A prices above rm B, even though its product has lower quality. It can do so thanks
to brand loyal customers (horizontal di¤erentiation). It does not payo¤ to battle over consumers
located in the middle of the Hotelling beach; it is more protable to charge a higher price for
brand loyal consumers. Competitive pressure from rm B though destroys its prots.
As we increase network compatibility marginally (to t = 0:95), we open up competition within
the market, which benets rm A because of the large size of the rival network. Firm As o¤ering
becomes more attractive, despite lower quality. Firm A can increase market share signicantly
by lowering its price. At the same time, rm B increases its price in order to temper price
competition. If we increase compatibility even further (to t = 0:9), then rm As aggressive
behaviour is moderated and it concurs with rm B by increasing its price. It is no more protable
to ercely compete against the higher quality rm B: Note that rm Bs prots are not monotonic
in t: The large rm prefers either full incompatibility or high level of compatibility, as there is a
dip in prots initially when we depart from perfect incompatibility.
If compatibility was further increased, rms would further increase prices (tacit collusion ef-
fect) and prots would be driven up. Firm As aggressive pricing characterised above would be
eliminated also if spillovers were large. R&D would be relatively too expensive with regard to the
potential market share gain.
6 Surplus
We conclude our analysis with few comments on surplus. It was earlier shown that competitive
industry produces too little R&D compared with the social optimum. The Ramsey surplus for
symmetric qualities (vA = vB  ev) is obtained from the optimisation problem (10)
CSR = ev1  1
2
t

+
1
2
 +
1
4
2 +
7
4
: (20)
CSR equals total surplus generated in the industry. It is increasing in compatibility and in
spillovers.
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In the competitive symmetric duopoly, NE prots of a rm are
NESYM =
1
2

z   tev   1
9
(1  )2

: (21)
It is easy to see now that industry prots increase as spillovers increase. This is because of
cut backs in R&D outlays and subsequently higher prices. Industry prots increase as network
compatibility increases. This is due to relaxed price competition. Hence, private (rms) incentives
for compatibility and R&D appropriability are aligned with the Ramsey case.
Consumer surplus in the symmetric competitive duopoly is
CSNESYM = v + ev1 + 12 t

  c  5
4
z +
1
3
 
1  2 : (22)
It is straightforward to see that consumer surplus decreases as spillovers increase or as network
compatibility increases. Both features are consequences of rmsdecisions to raise prices.
Total surplus in the competitive duopoly is given by WNESYM = CS
NE
SYM +2
NE
SYM ; which equals
to
WNESYM = v  
1
4
z   c+ ev1  1
2
t

+
2
9
(1  ) (1 + 2) : (23)
When considering the total surplus, the sign of the comparative statics with respect to spillovers
is not constant. Total surplus is maximised with  = 14 . When spillovers are below the cut-o¤
point of 14 , increase in spillovers increases total surplus. In this region, rmsprots increase more
than the consumer surplus decreases. With spillovers above the cut-o¤ point, a marginal increase
in spillovers causes a reduction in total surplus. Firmsincentives for R&D appropriability di¤er
from social incentives under competition.
Total surplus increases in network compatibility. The increase in rmsprots outweighs the
decrease in consumer surplus. Hence, total surplus is maximised with t = 0. Private and social
incentives for compatibility match. However, consumers would be better o¤ with incompatible
networks and intense price competition.
The asymmetric qualities case examined with the numerical example provides similar results.
Consumer surplus decreases in spillovers and network compatibility everywhere due to relaxed
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price competition. Total surplus tends to increase in network compatibility because the positive
change in prots dominates. There is also a spillovers threshold that maximises total surplus. The
only region where these results break is the area where R&D is (almost) perfectly appropriated
( = 0) and networks (almost) completely incompatible (t = 1). This is the region where the lower
quality rm has unconventional behaviour illustrated in the numerical example. When spillovers
or network compatibility is increased in that region, lower quality rm aggressively increases R&D
and lowers its price. Its prots go up, but the positive e¤ect is dominated by a decrease in higher
quality rms prots and in consumer surplus.
7 Conclusions
How spillovers and compatibility jointly a¤ect rm behaviour in strategic games with network
externalities has been overlooked in the literature. Network e¤ects have also been overlooked
by focusing on symmetric equilibria. We studied the interplay between demand side network
e¤ects and strategic R&D. We constructed a duopoly model with horizontal di¤erentiation and
exogenously given product qualities. Horizontal di¤erentiation provided us means to derive a
unique equilibrium, which is needed to obtain determinate comparative statics. Exogenously
given quality di¤erence helped to study situations where rms start in asymmetric positions. An
alternative, but principally analogous, way to establish asymmetric positions is via xed installed
customer bases à la Crémer et al. (2000)10 .
The role of R&D spillovers and network compatibility in price competition has been covered
in this paper. Higher spillovers have a tendency to reduce incentives to invest in R&D and push
up prices. Network compatibility tends to moderate price competition by reducing market share
competition. Both e¤ects have a similar background. Spillovers reduce the competitive advantage
a rm can get by investing more than its rival in R&D. Network compatibility reduces the strategic
10 Crémer et al. (2000) is a network competition model with endogenous quality and xed captive customer
bases. They analyse internet backbone operator competition, where the quality of interconnection is chosen by the
operators.
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value of rm-specic customer networks. Thus, the "tacit collusion e¤ects" dominant in pure price
setting models carry over to two-stage games in general.
We also showed how a rm may take up reverse actions as R&D appropriability or network
compatibility conditions are altered compared to what the standard models would predict. Sym-
metry was found to support regular rm behaviour. This is natural as the strategic positions of
the rms are levelled, which inicts symmetric behaviour that cancels out. Hence, asymmetry is
required if a rms behaviour is to di¤er from the norm. Once we considered asymmetric rms,
we found cases where the underdog rm takes reverse actions compared to conventional predic-
tions. As R&D spillovers or network compatibility were increased, the underdog rm increases its
investments and decreases its price. However, this unorthodox behaviour is not universal, even in
asymmetric settings. The strategic variables must have su¢ cient power. Only when spillovers and
compatibility level are low, such reverse behaviour exists. In that case, network externalities in-
tensify the e¤ect induced by strategic investments. In contrast, if compatibility (or spillovers) are
very high, the strategic value of rm-specic market shares (or R&D investments) are diminished,
supporting regular behaviour.
Although the newly found unconventional results are less than universal, their existence is
interesting. Asymmetry between rms is more common than symmetry. Consequently, rm
behaviour in industries with network externalities can di¤er from conventional predictions. In
order to have it not surprising, the reverse behaviour should be seen as a renement to theory.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Di¤erentiation of equation (8) gives ds
NE
d =
2
A 2(1 )
 
1  2sNE : The
term 2A 2(1 ) is positive by condition (A1). Therefore, the derivative
dsNE
d is positive only if
sNE < 12 holds. Since we have s
NE = 12  
(vB vA)(1  12 t)
2
3 (1 )[A 2(1 )]
; the rms market share is less than
half, only if its quality is lower than rivals quality, sNE < 12 , vA < vB : Hence, we have that, if
vA < vB holds, then ds
NE
d > 0 follows. By symmetry, a respective rule holds for rm B.
Proof of Lemma 2. Di¤erentiation of equation (8) yields
dsNE
dt
=
(vB   vA)
h
z   (vA + vB)  29 (1  )2
i
1
3

2
3 (1  ) [A  2 (1  )]
	2 : (24)
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The sign of the numerator depends now on the relative qualities (vA; vB) ; on the transportation
cost z; and on spillovers . For a given pair (vA; vB) ; the sign of the derivative ds
NE
dt is di¤erent
for high and low price sensitivity. Equation (24) gives the following rule
(i) z < vA + vB +
2
9
(1  )2 )
8>><>>:
vA < vB ) dsNEdt < 0
vA > vB ) dsNEdt > 0
(ii) z > vA + vB +
2
9
(1  )2 )
8>><>>:
vA < vB ) dsNEdt > 0
vA > vB ) dsNEdt < 0
:
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Part one of Proposition 3 follows directly from equation (15).
(ii) Write the comparative statics as dx
NE
A
d =   23sNE + 23 (1  ) ds
NE
d : The RHS comprises
the direct e¤ect and the indirect e¤ect of a marginal change in R&D spillovers. The direct e¤ect
equals to   23sNE ; which is always non-positive. The indirect e¤ect equals to   23 (1  ) ds
NE
d : By
Lemma 1, we have ds
NE
d > 0, vA < vB :
(iii) Dene
h () =  2
3
sNE +
2
3
(1  ) ds
NE
d
: (25)
Di¤erentiating h () with respect to quality relation  = vBvA gives @h@ = 23 (1  ) @
2sNE
@@  
2
3
@sNE
@ : Next, we di¤erentiate s
NE with respect to : This gives ds
NE
d =
vA[ (1+t)+3tsNE]
2
3 (1 )[A 2(1 )]
>
0 , sNE > 1+t3t : Hence rm As market share increases with an increase in the quality of the
rival good only if its market share is higher than 1+t3t : Term
1+t
3t is decreasing in t; and with
perfect incompatibility it becomes 23 : When the positive relation
dxNEA
d > 0 holds, we know that
sNE < 12 from part (ii). Consequently, if
dxNEA
d > 0 holds, then
@sNE
@ < 0: Next we compute
@2sNE
@@ =
9(1 ) 1tvA(1 2sNE) 4[A 2(1 )] dsNEd
[A 2(1 )]2 . We get the result s
NE < 12 ) @
2sNE
@@ > 0: Hence,
if sNE < 12 holds, then we have
@h
@ > 0; which implies that higher quality di¤erence makes the
positive relation dx
NE
A
d > 0 more likely.
Next, we di¤erentiate h () with respect to spillovers. We get @h@ = 23 (1  ) @
2sNE
@2
  43 @s
NE
@ :
The second derivative is @
2sNE
@2
=
 2( A1 +2)(1 2sNE) 4[A 2(1 )] ds
NE
d
[A 2(1 )]2 : By Lemma 1, we have
27
@sNE
@ > 0 , sNE < 12 ; which implies that if sNE < 12 ) @
2sNE
@2
< 0: In total, if sNE < 12
holds, then we have @h@ < 0; which implies that lower spillovers level makes the positive relation
dxNEA
d > 0 more likely.
Finally, we di¤erentiate h () with respect to t:We get @h@t =
9(vA+vB)(1 ) 1(1 2sNE) 4[A 2(1 )] dsNEdt
[A 2(1 )]2 :
When transportation costs are su¢ ciently low (as dened in Lemma 2), z < vA+ vB + 29 (1  )2,
@h
@t > 0 holds if vA < vB : With higher transportation costs, the sign of
@h
@t becomes ambiguous.
Hence, conditional on su¢ ciently low transportation costs, if sNE < 12 ; then the case
dxNEA
d > 0 is
more likely with low levels of network compatibility.
Proof of Proposition 4. Start with symmetric qualities, thus with equal NE rm sizes.
Equation (16) can be expressed as dp
NE
A
d jvA=vB= 23  0: Di¤erentiation of the numerator of
equation (16) with respect to s yields 2 (1  ) [2z   t (vA + vB)] ; which is always positive. Hence,
the numerator increases in s: This proves that, for rm with larger market share always increases
its price under a marginal increase in spillovers.
Term   34 (1  )2 in equation (16) is always negative, but the sign of the rst term depends
on parameter values. If sNE < 12 ; the numerator is negative for low levels of spillovers. With zero
spillovers, the numerator equals    1  2sNE [2z   t (vA + vB)] < 0: For high levels of spillovers,
the numerator is positive. With perfect spillovers, the numerator becomes 3 [2z   t (vA + vB)] > 0:
Hence, there exists at least one spillover level, , below which smaller rm decreases its price
under a marginal increase in spillovers, and above which it increases its price as spillovers are
marginally increased.
Proof of Proposition 5. Proof follows directly from Lemma 2.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let vA < vB : Firm As NE price can be expressed as
pNEA = c+ z  
1
3

2
3
(1  ) (1 + 2) + 2
3
(1  )2 sNE   (1  2t) vA + (1 + t) vB

: (26)
The derivative of pNEA with respect to t is
dpNEA
dt
=  1
3

2
3
(1  )2 ds
NE
dt
+ 2vA + vB

: (27)
28
First observation is that whenever ds
NE
dt is positive, the sign of
dpNEA
dt is always negative. In such
a case, rm A always increases its NE price if network compatibility is marginally increased.
dpNEA
dt
< 0, ds
NE
dt
> 0:
Next, consider the case when ds
NE
dt is negative. In this case, rm A may increase or decrease
its NE price conditional on the magnitude of the change in its market share. By rearranging the
square bracketed term in equation (27), the following rule is established
dpNEA
dt
< 0, 0 > ds
NE
dt
>   2vA + vB
2
3 (1  )2
dpNEA
dt
> 0, ds
NE
dt
<   2vA + vB
2
3 (1  )2
:
Firm Bs market share moves in the opposite direction. Its NE price is
pNEB = c+ z  
1
3

2
3
(1  ) (2 + )  2
3
(1  )2 sNE   (1  2t) vB + (1 + t) vA

: (28)
The derivative with respect to t is
dpNEB
dt
=  1
3

 2
3
(1  )2 ds
NE
dt
+ 2vB + vA

; (29)
which yields respective comparative statics
dsNE
dt < 0) dp
NE
B
dt < 0
0 < ds
NE
dt <
2vB+vA
2
3 (1 )2
) dpNEBdt < 0
dsNE
dt >
2vB+vA
2
3 (1 )2
) dpNEBdt > 0:
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